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FREE SPEECH AND MODERN REPUBLICAN 
GOVERNMENT* 
Murray Dry** 
The title of this essay reflects the importance we attach to free-
dom of speech, both for its own sake and for the sake of free govern-
ment. As we understand free government today, its foundation lies 
in individual rights rather than a selfless dedication to the commu-
nity, and that is why I chose the term modern republican govern-
ment. My discussion draws largely on Supreme Court decisions 
concerning freedom of speech. It will, however, turn from constitu-
tional law to political philosophy because of the inherent relation-
ship between thought and political life. 1 
That relationship became evident during the very year of the 
Court's first free speech decision, when in a dissent Holmes wrote: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that 
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 2 
This argument sounds more like John Stuart Mill's On Liberty than 
the Declaration of Independence, or the founders' Constitution. 
When Jefferson wrote that "the opinions of men are not the object 
of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction," he was referring to 
opinions regarding religion.3 Mill is the one who wrote that "truth, 
in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the 
reconciling and combining of opposites," and further, that since 
"the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never 
the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that 
I would like to thank my colleague, Eve Adler. for her comments on an earlier draft 
of this essay, and Daniel Northrop, my research assistant during the summer of 1989, for 
assisting me in the final revisions. 
** Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. 
I. See Cropsey, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE ISSUES OF POLITICS {1977). 
2. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
3. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill For F.stablishing Religious Freedom (1779), THE PoRTA-
BLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 251-52 (M. Peterson ed. 1975). This particular clause, which Jef-
ferson wrote in 1779, was deleted by the Virginia legislature when it was adopted in 1786. 
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the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied."4 
An inquiry into the philosophic sources of our free speech doc-
trines will clarify our understanding of the relationship between the 
founders' understanding of freedom and our own.s In addition, it 
may provide us with a basis for improving our approach to first 
amendment questions. I will begin with an overview of our consti-
tutional doctrines concerning free speech, focusing on the justifica-
tions for free speech protection and the resulting judicial tests or 
devices for protecting it. In Part II, I will turn to the American 
founders' views on freedom of speech. Because direct evidence re-
garding the meaning and importance of freedom of speech for the 
founders is scanty, and because the judicial arguments draw on 
more than is made explicit, I will turn in Part III to the philosophic 
foundations of our Constitution, focusing on Locke and Spinoza. I 
will conclude by suggesting some changes in the Supreme Court's 
treatment of free speech. 
I 
Professor Gerald Gunther introduces the voluminous material 
on free speech, which comprises thirty percent of his casebook,6 
with two questions: ( 1) "What justifies special solicitude for free 
speech values?"; and (2) "[W]hat judicial techniques serve best to 
manifest that judicial solicitude?" Let us consider how he illus-
trates the answers that different Justices have given to these 
questions. 
Gunther identifies three different justifications for free speech 
protection: 
I. to promote individual self-expression and self-realization; 
2. to serve a system of representative democracy and self-government; 
3. to serve to promote the search for knowledge and "truth" in the "marketplace 
of ideas." 
Consider first Justice Brandeis's famous concurring opinion in 
Whitney v. California, a criminal syndicalism case. 7 Brandeis's cele-
4. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 46, 50 (Norton ed. 1975). 
5. Mill's importance for our understanding of freedom of speech suggests that consti-
tutional interpretation cannot simply be described in terms of historical legal research or 
logical analysis. The debate has been cast in recent times in terms of interpretivism, or a 
jurisprudence of original intention, versus non-interpretivism, or a jurisprudence of contem-
porary ratification. If the choice is between historical study to determine what the founders 
said in order to decide, with nothing else. a contemporary issue, versus a constitutional law 
that pays no attention to the founding principles, we are in trouble. 
6. G. Gt;NTHER, CONSTJTCTIOI'AL LAW (lith ed. 1985). 
7. Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to 
make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative 
forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a 
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bration of liberty supports both the self-realization goal and the self-
government goal, and, to some extent, the marketplace of ideas ap-
proach to truth. He agrees that the development of human faculties 
was the object of the government established by our founders, and 
that our republican form required an alert citizenry rather than an 
inert people. Fear of punishment breeds repression and hate, which 
menaces stable government, and speech liberates men from irra-
tional fears. After referring to, without explaining, "the wide differ-
ence between advocacy and incitement," Brandeis continues: "In 
order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be 
shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or 
was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe 
that such advocacy was then contemplated." 
Both Holmes in Abrams and Brandeis in Whitney seem to have 
thought that the individuals and organizations involved in the crim-
inal cases are misguided but harmless, and that it was an abuse of 
government authority to imprison them. (Whitney was a member 
of the Left Wing Socialists, but she did not herself vote for the use 
of violence as part of the party program.) But suppose the organi-
zation was stronger? Is there never anything to worry about? 
Brandeis expresses confidence that if the speech falls short of 
incitement to violence, speech can counteract speech and "political 
truth," which must mean political freedom and sound policy, will 
win out. Holmes expressed a similar view in Abrams, but now con-
sider his dissent in Gitlow, a criminal syndicalism case similar to 
Whitney, decided two years earlier in 1925. 
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the 
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as 
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth: 
that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile: that with them, 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of nox-
ious doctrine: that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people: that public 
discussion is a political duty: and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions 
are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction: that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and 
imagination: that fear breeds repression: that repression breeds hate: that hate 
menaces stable government: that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss 
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies: and that the fitting remedy for 
evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through 
public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in 
its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities. they 
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. 
Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of free speech to free men 
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there 
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is 
practiced. 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927). 
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It is said that this [Left Wing Socialist] manifesto was more than a theory, that it 
was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if 
believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy 
stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an 
opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the 
result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the re-
dundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If 
in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be 
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech 
is that they should be given their chance and have their way8 
No wonder that Gunther did not include this passage among 
his "Hall of Fame" of memorable first amendment pronounce-
ments, but it is instructive. While Holmes claims there is no danger 
in the instant case, his general position is that if people choose to 
destroy their free government as a result of being persuaded to join 
the cause of the Communist Revolution, so be it. Hence, Holmes 
advocates free speech for its own sake, regardless of its conse-
quences for free government. 
Holmes's Gitlow opinion is unusual for its skepticism, but a 
more moderate formulation of the same skepticism comes from Jus-
tice Robert H. Jackson, in the second flag salute case. Writing an 
opinion for a six-to-three majority invalidating a required pledge of 
allegiance and salute to the flag as a condition of public school at-
tendance in West Virginia, Jackson wrote: "If there is any fixed star 
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein. " 9 
Perhaps Jackson did not mean that there were no orthodoxies, 
only that they could not be prescribed. He did suggest that cultivat-
ing patriotism through required civics courses would be constitu-
tional. But if it is worthwhile to learn about and appreciate the 
principles of American government, why did he suggest that the 
only fixed star of our Constitution was negative? 
Finally, there is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in which the 
Supreme Court brought the states' treatment of libel law under the 
rubric of the first amendment, at least as applied to public officials. 
To protect political speech critical of government officials, and 
newspapers reporting such criticism, the Supreme Court adopted 
the now famous rule that for a public official to win a libel judgment 
he must show that he was libelled with malice, with "reckless disre-
gard for the truth." Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan de-
8. 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925). 
9. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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scribed our "profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials." 1 o 
Our examples have illustrated the three different justifications 
for free speech mentioned by Gunther. Two of the justifications 
(self-expression and the marketplace rationale) reflect more faith in 
the automatic self-correcting devices of free speech and free govern-
ment than we would associate with the founders. The self-govern-
ment rationale was clearly manifest in the Times case. 
The so-called categorical approach to speech reflects the exten-
siveness of the demands that can be made in the name of self-ex-
pression and self-realization as well as the tolerance that the 
marketplace of ideas approach requires. For example, the reigning 
Miller test for obscenity effectively permits the outlawing of only 
hard core pornography since any work containing "serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value" is protected, regardless of its 
appeal to the prurient interest of the average person and regardless 
of its patently offensive character.II Libertarians are not happy 
with the test as it stands, but its permissiveness is confirmed by the 
fact that when the Supreme Court upheld a New York law banning 
the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual 
conduct, it acknowledged that the films were not legally obscene. 
The potential harm to children, as subjects of pornographic mate-
rial, was held to justify the law.12 So child pornography is another 
category of exclusion from first amendment protection, but it con-
firms the limits of the Miller test for obscenity. 
II 
The first amendment does not describe a simple absolute. In 
contrast to the language for religion-no law respecting an estab-
lishment, for example-the speech language refers to no law 
"abridging" freedom of speech. Since "abridge" means to shorten 
or curtail, one needs to know what the existing state of freedom of 
speech was that must not be curtailed. Professor Leonard Levy is 
the leading constitutional authority on the meaning of free speech 
(and free press, which was not considered separate from the free 
speech clause). As he observes, the Americans were well aware of 
the existing English common law rule on freedom of freedom of 
10. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
II. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
12. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982). 
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speech and press; it was found in Blackstone's Commentaries on the 
Laws of England and guaranteed a freedom to publish without first 
obtaining a license. It did not protect the publisher or the writer 
from criminal or civil action for libel, including seditious libel as 
well as private libel. 13 Contrary to Zechariah Chafee, who argued 
that the framers of the first amendment intended " 'to wipe out the 
common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criti-
cisms of the government, without any incitement to law-breaking, 
forever impossible in the United States of America'," Levy argues 
that "the immediate history of the drafting and adoption of the 
First Amendment's freedom of speech and press clause does not 
suggest an intent to institute broad reform."t4 As Levy reviews the 
evidence, the Anti-Federalists were mainly interested in "states' 
rights, not civil rights," and "no one [of the Anti-Federalists] had 
come to grips with any of the real problems connected with the 
freedom of the press." ts 
The most recent controversy over Levy's interpretation con-
cerns his assertion that in response to the Sedition Act of 1798, the 
Jeffersonians, including Madison, did in fact originate a broad liber-
tarian theory of freedom of speech, meaning a theory that repudi-
ated seditious libelt6 as inconsistent with that freedom in republican 
government. The Sedition Act punished malicious writing, utter-
ances, or publications which might excite the people against the 
government or government officials or stir up sedition. As Levy 
points out, it was an improvement on the existing common law, 
since truth and good motive could be used as a defense and those 
issues went to the jury, whereas previously truth was said to aggra-
vate the libel. t7 
Professor Walter Berns, who has written extensively on the 
first amendment, and has discussed the first edition of Levy's book 
in three different places, applauds Levy for his full and fair exami-
13. L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 12-13 (1985). This is a substantial revi-
sion of Levy's earlier work, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HIS-
TORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960). In his preface to the recent work, Levy explains his 
changed title by noting that "the American experience with a free press was as broad as the 
theoretical inheritance was narrow." "To one whose prime concern was law and theory, a 
legacy of suppression came into focus; to one who looks at newspaper judgments on public 
men and measures, the revolutionary controversy spurred an expanding legacy of liberty." 
14. /d. at 220. Levy quotes from Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 21 (1948). 
15. /d. at 221, 244. 
16. Seditious libel is defined as "[A] communication written with the intent to incite the 
people to change the government otherwise than by lawful means, or to advocate the over-
throw of the government by force or violence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1218 (5th ed. 
1979) (citing the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385). 
17. /d. at 12. 
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nation of the historical record, which yields the conclusion that the 
founders did not intend to repudiate the common law of seditious 
libel, but he thinks Levy goes too far in attributing to the Jeffersoni-
ans an intention to adopt a broad libertarian theory in response to 
the Sedition Act.I8 According to Berns, "this new 'libertarianism' 
contains a considerable admixture of the familiar Jeffersonian 
states' rights theory of the Constitution."I9 
The heated historiographic debate between Levy and Berns 
reveals more agreement than disagreement between these two schol-
ars. Berns acknowledges that the leading Republicans, including 
Madison, Albert Gallatin, Gorge Hay, St. George Tucker, and Tu-
nis Wortman, presented more extensive arguments in support of 
freedom of speech and press in response to the Federalists' Sedition 
Act, but he claims that these men were not full-fledged "libertari-
ans" in the modern sense (which is also Levy's) because they did 
not believe that in the realm of politics truth was relative and, con-
sequently, they allowed the states to punish libei.2o Levy, on the 
other hand, acknowledges that the Republicans permitted the pros-
ecution of libel in the state courts, but he insists that while they 
sometimes referred to state prosecutions, the Republicans in fact 
meant libel against private reputations, not seditious libel, and that 
Madison eventually concluded that only private suits should be en-
tertained to protect the reputation of public officials against such 
libel.2I 
With so much attention paid to the historical question con-
cerning the state of freedom of speech and press in America from 
1789 to 1801, it is possible to overlook the question from political 
philosophy: what is the sound understanding of that freedom? 
Berns defends an approach to freedom of speech and press which 
places restrictions on that freedom, on the grounds that the mainte-
nance of free government requires it. Levy finally reveals his sup-
port for the modern, expanded view of freedom of speech in his 
conclusion, where he describes the framers' "genius for studied 
imprecision." 
Detailed codes, which become obsolete with a change in the particular circum-
18. W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY ch. 3 (1976) (esp. pp. 101-19). See also Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and 
Sedition Acts: A Reappraisal, SUP. CT. REv. 109; and Berns, Free Speech and Free Govern-
ment, THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER, 217-41. 
19. W. BURNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY, 112. 
20. !d. at 112-119. See also Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Acts: 
A Reappraisal, SuP. CT. REV. 135-142 (1970). 
21. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 13 at 325-31. 
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stances for which they were adopted, are avoided by men trained in the common 
law. They tend rather to formulate principles that are expansive and comprehen-
sive in character. The principles and not their Framers' understanding and applica-
tion of them are meant to endure. The Constitution, designed by an eighteenth-
century rural society, serves as well today as ever because an antiquarian histori-
cism that would freeze its original meaning has not guided its interpretation and 
was not intended to.22 
I take it that by "antiquarian historicism" Levy means respect-
ing old opinions, that is, interpreting the first amendment's freedom 
of speech clause as it was understood at the time of the founding. 
There may be a good reason for our not limiting our understanding 
of freedom of speech to the practice at the end of the eighteenth 
century, but we need to know what it is. Levy does not give any 
reasons for his preference for the "libertarian" theory. That is un-
satisfactory because, on his own account, even the first advocates of 
the new theory saw the need for protecting the reputations of public 
officials, albeit apparently not through criminal law.23 
There is virtually no discussion of freedom of speech in the 
debates surrounding the framing and ratification of the federal Con-
stitution. That is why I have relied on Levy's account of the status 
of the common law on seditious libel to determine what the Anti-
Federalists meant by proposing an amendment guaranteeing free-
dom of speech and what the framers of the Bill of Rights meant by 
passing what became the first amendment. 
It is instructive that so extensive a debate on the meaning of 
republican government took place without any debate on the mean-
ing of freedom of speech. There is a connection, however, between 
the first amendment and the Anti-Federalist position on republican 
government. Professor Herbert Storing, who showed how the Bill 
22. !d. at 348. 
23. There is one other interpretation of "abridge" which we should note. Professor 
George Anastaplo draws on the Declaration to argue that "abridge" should not be under-
stood in reference to the English common law, but to the state of nature. Furthermore, he 
argues that American colonists' resistance to Great Britain, which eventuated in revolution, 
illustrates the intentions of the first amendment: 
[T]he patriots were not willing to rely upon the judgment or opinion of constituted 
authority. even though it was an authority to which they and their fathers had long 
acknowledged allegiance. The principle they acted upon seemed to be that the 
American citizen should be left free to criticize his government, even in the most 
decisive manner, when he believes that the government acts improperly. 
G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, 109 (1971). To argue that the first amendment 
constitutionalized the right of revolution is remarkable, not only in light of the historical 
study that Levy provided, but also in light of the distinction which John Locke made, and 
which the Americans drew on in the Declaration, between legitimate governmental power 
and the people's natural, or pre-political power. And since the "abridging" extends also to 
freedom of the press and petitioning the government, how could these be referred to the state 
of nature? 
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of Rights was a Federalist production necessitated by the Anti-Fed-
eralists, put the point this way: 
There is still in our Bill of Rights an echo of the earlier declarations of natural 
rights and maxims of well constituted free governments. This is especially true of 
the First Amendment, which might be described as a statement in matter-of-fact 
legal form of the great end of free government, to secure the private sphere, and the 
great means for preserving such a government, to foster an alert and enlightened 
citizenry. In the form of a protection of civil liberties, then, the First Amendment 
echoes the great principles of natural liberty and free government that play so large 
a role in the state bills of rights24 
To get a fuller account of the principles of modern republican 
government and their relation to freedom of speech, I want to con-
sider Locke and Spinoza on religion and its relation to government, 
as well as Spinoza's argument for liberal democracy and freedom of 
speech. This is because the argument for freedom of religion had 
implications for, and in part resembled, the argument for freedom 
of speech, especially freedom of the press. My sources are Locke's 
Letter Concerning Toleration and Spinoza's Theologico-Political 
Treatise. 
III 
Seventeenth-century philosophers were confronted with the 
fact of Christianity, which as practiced threatened their freedom to 
philosophize. The practical intention of their writings was to free 
philosophy from the confinement of Biblical religion. Spinoza did 
this by distinguishing between the sphere of philosophy and the 
sphere of faith. "[F]rom the Bible itself we learn, without the small-
est difficulty or ambiguity, that its cardinal precept is: To love God 
above all things, and one's neighbor as one's self."2s Since scripture 
"does not aim at imparting scientific knowledge, . . . it demands 
from men nothing but obedience, and censures obstinacy, not igno-
rance."26 To separate faith from philosophy, Spinoza had to ex-
plain prophecy in terms of the imagination of the individual prophet 
and the needs of his audience, rather than the prophet's divine 
knowledge. Spinoza's circumspect discussion of miracles suggests 
that the events in question either have a natural explanation or did 
24. H. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, EsSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 32, 48 (M. Judd Harmon ed. 1978). Note that Storing identified the 
importance of written declarations of rights, as a source of restraint on government, with the 
Anti-Federalists. Furthermore, he understood the first amendment to protect freedom in the 
private sphere every bit as much as political speech. 
25. BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE XII-172 (Dover edi-
tion, Elwes trans. 1670). 
26. /d. at XII, 176. 
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not occur.27 
In the last five chapters of this work, Spinoza makes a Hobbes-
ian argument for a government based on absolute sovereignty. He 
reconciles it to the divine law that one love God above all and one's 
neighbor as one's self, by arguing that "justice ... and absolutely all 
the precepts of reason, including love towards one's neighbour, re-
ceive the force of laws and ordinances solely through the rights of 
dominion, that is, ... solely on the decree of those who possess the 
right to rule. " 28 "This conclusion," he argues two pages later, "is 
supported by experience, for we find traces of Divine justice only in 
places where just men bear sway; elsewhere the same lot ... befalls 
the just and the unjust, the pure and the impure: a state of things 
which causes Divine Providence to be doubted by many who think 
that God immediately reigns among men, and directs all nature for 
their benefit. "29 
Spinoza wrote with a candor that impressed even Hobbes, who 
was not known for his caution and tact. He saw the need for reli-
gion, we might say, but it was in the service of the worldly aim of 
comfortable self-preservation. Locke's argument differed from Spi-
noza's by separating religion from government and relegating the 
latter to the private sphere. Locke did it by separating the task of 
government from the task of religion. Government was formed to 
attend to civil interests, such as "Life, Liberty, Health, and In-
dolency of Body, and the Possession of outward things, such as 
Money, Lands, Houses, Furniture and the like."Jo Religion was 
concerned with care of the souls, and government could have noth-
ing to do with this. One can only find salvation through the light of 
one's own conscience. Churches are free and voluntary societies 
whose end is the public worship of God. 
Locke goes on to discuss the outward form and rites of worship 
and the doctrines and articles of faith. The former are subject to 
legitimate regulation. If a religious practice is indifferent from the 
perspective of civil interests, it is permitted, otherwise not; commu-
nion is fine, child sacrifice is not. As for articles of faith, some are 
speculative, some practical. Concerning the former, Locke borrows 
from Milton: "For Truth certainly would do well enough, if she 
were once left to shift for her self. "Jt Later, Mill would extend that 
principle to all opinions, and that has become a staple of our first 
amendment doctrine. In Locke, however, it is limited to speculative 
27. !d. at Chapters I, II, and IV. 
28. !d. at XIX, 247. 
29. !d. at XIX, 249. 
30. J. LOCKE, A LETIER CONCERNING TOLERATION 26 (Tully ed. 1983). 
31. !d. at 46. 
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matters regarding religion. As for practical articles, Locke recog-
nizes some limits: in general, they include restrictions on associa-
tions and opinions contrary to "those moral Rules which are 
necessary to the preservation of Civil Society," and affirmation of 
the "Being of a God."32 This last, which resembles Spinoza's reli-
gious dogmas, seems to require nothing more than a willingness to 
profess theism. 
Both Spinoza and Locke, then, are anxious to keep religion out 
of the way of philosophers and of a government that busies itself 
with the worldly objective of securing individual rights. Spinoza 
provides for a government-controlled religion; Locke argues for sep-
aration (except that affirmation of God's being is necessary, to be 
able to trust someone on the witness stand, as he puts it.) American 
constitutionalism followed Locke on separation of religion from 
public life, and went a step further. There is an explicit prohibition 
in the Constitution, article VI, section 3, against any religious oath 
for office, and the first amendment prohibits Congress from passing 
any "law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof." 
Both Locke's and Spinoza's treatments of religion reveal an 
important feature of modern republican government. In contrast to 
ancient democracy, the government's interest in religion, whether it 
be in the public or the private sphere, is limited to securing individ-
ual rights. 
I turn now to Spinoza's argument for freedom of speech. Spi-
noza starts from freedom of thought, claiming that the mind cannot 
be controlled. Since he already indicated an awareness of the 
thought-control potential for propaganda, we note that Spinoza's 
free speech argument begins with something less than a rigorous 
philosophic argument. Then he argues that because most men do 
not know when to keep quiet, a moderate government must grant 
freedom of speech as well as thought. While Spinoza's argument 
about politics starts from a hard boiled realism that leads to abso-
lute sovereignty, it then proceeds by focusing on what is feasible 
given human frailty, rather than on what is legitimate (which in-
cludes everything the sovereign commands). 
In light of this concession to weakness, as well as the fact that 
Spinoza considers the life of philosophic contemplation as perfectly 
rational and best, the following argument about the object of gov-
ernment is striking: 
[T]he object of government is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or 
32. /d. at 49. 
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puppets, but to enable them to develope their minds and bodies in security, and to 
employ their reason unshackled; neither showing hatred, anger, or deceit, nor 
watched with the eyes of jealousy and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government 
is liberty_33 
Earlier, Spinoza described living together secure in one's rights 
as a rational object that all but fools would agree to. Now, he af-
firms a more substantial objective, the development of the minds of 
human beings. This objective lies between true rationality, philoso-
phy, and the limited rationality of self interest, i.e. of comfortable 
self-preservation.34 We may wonder how much Spinoza truly ex-
pected from free government, given the importance he attaches to 
philosophy and his earlier remarks that the non-philosophic many 
are governed by imagination rather than knowledge.3s 
After arguing for a freedom of speech consistent with modera-
tion, which therefore does not extend to sedition or to the denial of 
government's authority over individuals, Spinoza then claims that 
free thought and speech are "absolutely necessary for progress in 
science and the liberal arts: for no man follows such pursuits to 
advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and unhampered."36 
This resembles the current marketplace of ideas argument, although 
it is not as extensive. But Spinoza must have known, as we do, that 
scientific progress can be made without a general regime of freedom 
of speech. 
Spinoza's final argument considers the kind of people who will 
take offense if their freedom of speech is restricted. 
It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for the more rulers strive to 
curtail freedom of speech, the more obstinately are they resisted; not indeed by the 
avaricious, the flatters, and other numskulls, who think supreme salvation consists 
in filling their stomachs and gloating over their moneybags, but by those whom 
good education, sound morality, and virtue have rendered more free. Men, as gen· 
erally constituted, are most prone to resent the branding as criminal of opinions 
which they believe to be true, and the proscription as wicked of that which inspires 
them with piety toward God and man; hence they are ready to forswear the laws 
and conspire against the authorities, thinking it not shameful but honourable to stir 
up seditions and perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view. Such being the 
constitution of human nature, we see that laws directed against opinions affect the 
generous-minded rather than the wicked, and are adapted less for coercing 
criminals than for irritating the upright; so that they cannot be maintained without 
great peril to the state. 3 7 
33. SPINOZA, supra note 25, at XX, 259. 
34. For this point especially, and for this interpretation of Spinoza in general, I am 
indebted to Leo Strauss. Unpublished transcription of Spinoza seminar, University of Chi-
cago, 1959. 
35. SPINOZA, supra note 25, at Chapters I-11. 
36. /d. at XX, 261. 
37. !d. at XX, 261-62. 
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Spinoza goes on to argue that the greatest misfortune for a 
commonwealth is for "honourable men [to] be sent like criminals 
into exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot 
disguise."Js This "low but solid" argument merits our considera-
tion. It strikes me as much more realistic than our contemporary 
views about the benefits of free speech. 
Thus, in Spinoza we have found the link to Justice Brandeis 
and the self-development and self-expression justification for free-
dom of speech. Fully aware of the difference between the activity 
and interest of the philosophers and the non-philosophers, Spinoza 
nonetheless was the first philosopher to identify political liberty 
with rationality. Consequently, Spinoza originated an argument 
that, as Leo Strauss put it, "gives the highest type of man his oppor-
tunity equally as it gives the lowest type of man his opportunity."39 
The contemporary philosophic version of this position, which re-
flects Brandeis's position, is Ronald Dworkin's argument that every 
person has "a right to equal concern and respect."40 The subse-
quent advocates of Spinoza's argument seem to have forgotten the 
limits of an argument that equates rationality with human freedom. 
And it is ironic that the best argument for the freedom to develop 
human faculties turns out to be a prudential concession to human 
foolishness. 
This leads to another question concerning Spinoza's argument 
for free speech and free government. Assuming that most men are 
able to appreciate the case for their rights as well as the case for a 
freedom to develop their minds, how many will develop their minds 
enough to exercise a proper judgment in exercising their rights? Af-
ter all, a strong and stable government is necessary to prevent us 
from falling back into the dangers of the natural condition. How 
far, in other words, should the argument from the need to recognize 
the weakness of human beings be extended? 
IV 
Returning to the Supreme Court's treatment of freedom of 
speech, I think that the three justifications we began with-self-ex-
pression and self-realization, self-government, and the discovery of 
truth-should be recast along the lines Storing suggested.41 Free-
dom of speech is important for private liberty and for fostering an 
alert and enlightened citizenry. In place of self-development we 
38. /d. at XX, 263. 
39. Strauss, supra note 34, at 271. 
40. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xxi {1977). 
41. Storing, supra note 24. 
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find a right to be left alone and to say and do what one wishes. In 
place of a general concept of "self-government" we find a particular 
focus on the role of the electorate. 
Turning to the proper judicial test for restrictions on speech, I 
think a strict scrutiny approach is misguided. It places too high a 
burden on the government to justify what may be reasonable regula-
tions of marginal forms of expression; and it places too much im-
portance on the classification scheme, according to which some 
forms of expression are "in" and some are "out." Examples of the 
latter include the definitions of obscenity and "fighting words," and 
the status of "symbolic expression." Better to return to a rational 
basis test, but one with "bite," to borrow a phrase of Gunther's 
from another area of constitutional law. This would foster constitu-
tional protection to symbolic expression, such as burning a draft 
card or wearing a black armband to protest the war in Vietnam, or 
burning an American flag to protest a civil rights shooting or a pres-
idential campaign. It is easier to consider such obvious forms of 
expression of political opinion as covered by the first amendment 
when the test for a law's validity is not so difficult to satisfy. In 
addition, if speech is important for self-government, when opinions 
of citizens on matters of concern to them lead to regulations on 
certain forms of expression, they too merit consideration. The mar-
ketplace approach to expression reflects judicial abdication of judg-
ment concerning the relationship between the reasonableness of the 
regulation and the significance of the limitation on expression. 
The areas of speech protection most in need of reconsideration 
may well be group libel, obscenity and indecent speech generally. 
As long as the Brandenburg test (incitement to imminent violence) 
applies to all content-based regulations, that is, to group libel as 
well as subversive advocacy, the Klu Klux Klan can march and 
speak as it wants and the Nazi Party can march in uniforms and 
speak where it wants. Likewise, given the current definition of ob-
scenity and the combination of artistic presentation and graphic de-
piction of violence and sexuality, any attempt to regulate such 
material will fail. The Supreme Court recently refused to hear oral 
argument in a case in which an Indianapolis ordinance prohibiting 
graphic pornography as discrimination against women was struck 
down. Here is part of Judge Easterbrook's circuit court opinion: 
In Body Double, a suspense film directed by Brian DePalma, a woman who has 
disrobed and presented a sexually explicit display is murdered by an intruder with a 
drill. The drill runs through the woman's body. The film is sexually explicit and a 
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murder occurs-yet no one believes that the actress suffered pain or died 4 2 
The statute may have been too broad, but there is something troub-
ling about Judge Easterbrook's matter-of-fact assumption that the 
world of visual representations has nothing to do with the real 
world and therefore is of no valid concern to government. 
Regulation of indecent expression generally runs up against ju-
dicial reluctance to allow any exceptions to the rule of content neu-
trality. An exception, of sorts, illustrates this point. In Federal 
Communications Commissions v. Pacifica, the Supreme Court up-
held the Commission's warning to the radio station concerning it 
broadcasting of George Carlin's satirical "filthy words" monologue. 
The FCC received a complaint by a man who claimed he heard the 
broadcast while driving his young son. The vote was 5-4, and the 
majority divided over the grounds of the decision. Justice Stevens, 
continuing the approach he initiated in an earlier case when he first 
suggested that the content of some speech might justify regulation, 
likened the words of the monologue to obscenity. Granting that the 
monologue might be protected in other contexts, such as a night 
club, Stevens argued that because it contained "patently sexual ad 
excretory language," it was "not entitled to absolute constitutional 
protection under all circumstances."43 
Stevens's approach to these cases drew a strong reaction from 
Professor Gunther himself. "What the case comes down to ulti-
mately is a majority support of a prohibition of speech because it is 
offensive to the audience. [And] that is startlingly bad news." Gun-
ther goes on to suggest that it could lead to the censorship of racial 
epithets over the airwaves. Why is Gunther so alarmed at this? 
Has he no confidence in the judiciary's ability to discern when pro-
fanity may reasonably be restricted in public discourse? Judges 
often draw distinctions. And how much is lost if in a given case the 
line is drawn against such expression? 
Our high-toned expectations for freedom of speech have led to 
our being over-protective of various forms of expression, beyond 
any limit that the founders, or even John Stuart Mill, thought rea-
sonable. The founders could and did rely on the effects of religion 
in the private sphere to moderate the exercise of freedom, including 
expression. Mill allowed any speech connected to a commercial 
venture to be regulated.·H That would take care of pornography, 
42. American Booksellers Association Inc. v. Hudnut. 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 
1985). 
43. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation. 438 U.S. 726. 747 (1977). The earlier case was 
Young v. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
44. MILL, supra note 4, at 88. 
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for example. While we continue to pay lip service to Brandeis's 
standard, derived ultimately from Spinoza, that freedom generally 
and free speech in particular permit men to develop their faculties, 
when it comes to rules for expression, we seem to have lost confi-
dence in our ability to distinguish between a distinctively human 
faculty and animal desires. A more reasonable approach would 
note Spinoza's low but solid argument for allowing ample leeway 
regarding expression, but exercise judgment that supports restraint 
in public discourse. Some form of moderation in expression rein-
forces moderation in action, and as robust as it is, our form of gov-
ernment requires this. 
